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There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages
the affections of mankind, as the right of property.
Blackstone'
In our time property is the root of all evil and of the suffering of men
who possess it, or are without it, and of all the remorse of conscience
of those who misuse it, and of the danger of collision between those
who have [it] and those who have it not.
Property is the root of all evil: and, at the same time, property is
that toward [which] all the activity of our modern world is directed, and
that which directs the activity of the world.
Tolstoy2
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of property is powerful. It has a peculiar hold on the human
imagination and a particularly fundamental place in our constitutional struc-
ture.3 For the Founding generation4 and later constitutional interpreters, proper-
ty has been more than simply an imaginative or symbolic concept: it has been
the medium through which struggles between individual and collective goals
have been refracted. Protection of individual property rights has cut across all
parts of the political spectrum and has advanced radically different visions of
the values to be protected in American society.5
What is property? The importance of this concept is matched by the diffi-
culty of its definition. Felix Cohen has written that any useful definition of
property "must reflect the fact that property merges by imperceptible degrees
into government, contract, force, and value."6 Another commentator has written
that "what is property may depend upon the action that is dependent upon the
answer."
7
In this Essay, I examine the concept of property as it is reflected in the Su-
preme Court's recent Fifth Amendment due process and takings clause jurispru-
dence, and in other current approaches. I argue that the Supreme Court's
reliance on an "objective" or "technical" definition of property leads to conflict-
ing and contradictory results. I further argue that contemporary attempts by
scholars to reconstruct the historical understanding of property also fail to
overcome this incoherence. Both efforts-which reflect what I shall call an
"absolute approach"--fail because they are based upon the same unarticulated
assumptions: that property is objectively definable or identifiable, apart from
social context; and that it represents and protects the sphere of legitimate,
absolute individual autonomy.
The contemporary impulse toward equating the sphere of absolute individual
autonomy with the concept of property is, in fact, a radical narrowing of the
historical understanding of property. During the American Founding Era,
3. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts."); id., amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of... property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."); id., amend. XIV, §
1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of... property, without due process of law").
4. The preoccupation of the American Founders with the protection of property has long been the
subject of scholarly commentary and debate. See McDonald, A New Introduction, in C. BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1986).
5. Protection of individual property rights has included the hegemony of "freedom of contract" in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the subsequent erosion and eventual abandonment of "economic
due process" in the late 1930's, and later civil libertarian protection of individual rights. See Grey, Do We
Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 716-17 (1975); see, e.g., Funston, The Double
Standard of Constitutional Protection in the Era of the Welfare State, 90 POL. Sc. Q. 261 (1975);
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. Cr.
REV. 34.
6. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954).
7. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691, 694 (1938).
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property included not only external objects and people's relationships to them,
but also all of those human rights, liberties, powers, and immunities that are
important for human well-being, including: freedom of expression, freedom of
conscience, freedom from bodily harm, and free and equal opportunities to use
personal faculties. From an analysis of the particular rights, liberties, powers
and immunities contained within this broader conception, I argue that property,
in the historical view, did not represent the autonomous sphere of the individual
to be asserted against the collective; rather, it embodied and reflected the
inherent tension between the individual and the collective. This tension-now
seen as something external to the concept of property-was in fact internal to
it.
Reclaiming this conception'-which I shall call the "comprehensive ap-
proach"--provides an analytic framework that lends important insights into the
historical and jurisprudential treatment of the concept of property. It exposes
the core incoherence in the Supreme Court's current approach to property:
specifically, the conflict between the Court's ostensible use of an absolute
conception of property and its actual use of a broader conception-one that
remains largely unrevealed. Adoption of the comprehensive approach would
force courts to face explicitly the real policy issues involved in cases decided
under the takings and due process clauses, rather than resolving them silently
and obliquely through artificial manipulation of technical definitions of proper-
ty. This framework also makes explicit the role that an assumed, absolute
conception of property has had in the choice of the type of protection given to
interests threatened under the takings clause, and in the calculation of compen-
sation when the latter is imposed.
Finally, I suggest that there is intrinsic value in our rethinking of the
concept itself. The concept of property has powerful, rhetorical force. It is not
incidental to our lives or to our legal system; it is of central, almost emotional
importance. Contemporary approaches proceed from a vision of property as that
which protects and separates the individual from the collective sphere. By
viewing the collective context as necessary for the definition and exercise of
individual rights, the comprehensive approach forces us to rethink our image
of the relationships between individuals and the collectives of which they are
parts. It can lead us to a different concept of individual well-being and autono-
my: one that recognizes the individual's need for freedom as well as the need
for the development and expression of that freedom in the context of related-
ness to others.
8. The degree of self-consciousness about the use of this approach varied widely, with Madison, Locke,
and the English Opposition writers exhibiting greater awareness in this regard than other writers of their
day. See infra Section III. In this essay, I shall attempt to draw out the implications and the logic of a
conception that was widely held during that era, not to claim that those who were writing at that time used
such terms.
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I. CURRENT APPROACHES
In modem constitutional jurisprudence, the definition of property has played
its most critical role in the context of the due process and takings clauses of
the Fifth Amendment. Both clauses have been loci for friction between the
individual and government. Both clauses involve, at least ostensibly, the same
concept: property. Under both clauses, the existence of a cognizable property
interest is the threshold and often determinative question. Various tests-such
as the "ordinary understanding" approach,9 the "reasonable expectations" ap-
proach, 0 the "functional" approach," the "bundle of rights" approach, 2
and others13 -have been used to determine whether a constitutionally cogniza-
ble property interest exists. 4 The resulting incoherence is profound. An ease-
ment, conceptually severed from the underlying land, is property and compensa-
ble if taken;15 twenty-seven million tons of coal are not.' 6 The right to occu-
py land,'7 or to pass land to one's heirs," is property, compensable if taken;
9. This approach begins from the premise that the layperson understands property to be physical objects,
or "things," and proceeds to question whether a particular interest is sufficiently "thing-like" to be property.
An example of this approach is Bruce Ackerman's reference to the "Ordinary Observer." B. ACKERMAN,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-103 (1977); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (upholding right to enjoyment of one's land unencumbered by public access);
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (upholding right to bequeath property to one's heirs).
10. Under this approach, interests that are claimed to ba property must be sufficiently bound up with
a claimant's "reasonable expectations" to achieve recognition. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
262 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (investment interests
protected only to extent of reasonable return). The "entitlemene' doctrine in due process cases is a variant
of this approach. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (existence of federally
protected property interest depends on whether it was created by "existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law").
11. Under this approach, public sector jobs, licenses, and public income benefits are examples of
"property" under the due process clause. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. 733 (1964).
12. Under this approach, a claimed interest is property if it is included within the traditional "bundle"
of rights associated with property. This may be based on a "thing-like" conception of property, see supra
note 9, or on something else, such as a functional definition, see supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (extent to which interests
are integral to personhood should affect protection they are afforded as property); Singer, The Reliance
Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1988) (relational interests, i.e., reliance interests created over
time, should be considered in recognition of property rights).
14. Sometimes the issue is framed as whether the harm caused by governmental action is sufficient
to constitute a "taking" of property. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83
(1980); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 122. However, it is difficult to see how there is not a "taking" in all cases
where an individual's rights against the collective (i.e., her "property") are non-reciprocally impaired. See
id. at 143-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (destruction of recognized property interests is taking, unless
nuisance exists or claimant receives reciprocal benefit from challenged governmental activity); Rose,
Comment: Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in COMPENSATORY JUSTIcE: NOMOS XXXIII 1-3
(J. Chapman & I. Coleman eds. 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (whether governmental action is a"taking"
"depends upon some underlying understanding of what a property right entities you to do, and what it does
not").
15. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1989).
16. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-99 (1987).
17. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
18. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
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the right to modify a building that one owns, 19 or to prevent physical inva-
sion,20 is not. Attempted symmetry between the treatment of property under
the takings clause and under the due process clause also leads to incoherence
in social vision, since many who support governmental efforts to redistribute
property advocate a narrow definition of protected property in the takings
context and a broad definition in the due process context,21 while many who
hold the opposite view favor the reverse.' Indeed, the situation has caused
one commentator to charge that the concept of property "is no longer a coherent
or crucial category in our conceptual scheme" and that "[t]he concept of
property and the institution of property have disintegrated." 3
The incoherence in current approaches has led some to advocate a return
to what is claimed to be the original understanding of property. Richard Ep-
stein, in Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain,' sets
forth a conception of property that he attributes to Locke and the American
Founders. Under this view, property is a simple concept: it is the individual's
right to unfettered possession, disposition, and use of corporeal and incorporeal
objects. Any governmental action that limits these rights, as historically defined,
is a prima facie "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. If the taking is a justified
exercise of the police power, no compensation is due; if it is not, it can only
be done for another legitimate public use, and only with the payment of
compensation. 5 Under this analysis, all governmental attempts to redistribute
income through modification of common law liability rules, taxes, and other
regulations are takings. To the extent that such governmental transfers do not
19. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128-38 (1978).
20. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
21. Compare Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097 (1981)
(advocating constitutional foundation for protected property rights) with Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88
COLt M. L. REV. 1600 (1988) (arguing against"classical liberal" conception of property which constitutional-
ly immunizes property rights against change); Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676-78 (1988) (voicing concern about Supreme
Court's willingness to sever conceptually and provide constitutional protection for property rights in takings
cases) [hereinafter Liberal Conception of Property] with Radin, supra note 13 (advocating broad protection
for property identified with personhood). Both Michelman and Radin attempt to reconcile these conflicting
impulses by arguing that the degree of constitutional protection afforded should reflect inequalities in
political and economic power. See Michelman, Property as a ConstitutionalRight, supra, at 1112-14; Radin,
Liberal Conception of Property, supra, at 1692-95.
22. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)
(broad definition ofproperty in takings clause does not apply to welfare benefits or other property obtained
as result of collective attempts to redistribute income).
23. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69,74 (. Pennock & L Chapman
eds. 1980).
24. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 22.
25. Id. at 10-25, 35-104, 112, 161-98. This may include "implicit in-kind" compensation, where
restrictions imposed by the general legislation upon the rights of others serve as compensation for the
property taken. Id. at 195.
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equally benefit the parties from whom they are taken and to whom they are
given, they are unconstitutional.2
Other commentators, although highly critical of Epstein's use of this "origi-
nal understanding" of property for the purposes of constitutional interpretation,
do not challenge the starting point of his analysis: that property, as historically
understood, meant the individual's right to unfettered possession, disposition,
and use of material (and nonmaterial) things. Frank Michelman has written that
the Founders of American constitutionalism believed that:
property was [the] inspiration for the idea of a private sphere of individ-
ual self-determination securely bounded off from politics by law....
Property could bear such a heavy and crucial ideological load because
it was itself such a natural part of normative political imagina-
tion-transparent, unproblematic, and visually arresting in the mind's
eye. In the [Flounders' world, marking the boundaries between meum
and teum [sic] felt.., both conceptually and morally easy.27
Jennifer Nedelsky has written that in the Founding Era, property had a power-
ful, rhetorical image; it was "a specific, identifiable, knowable entity which held
a special place in law, republican theory and 'society'. Property was 'some-
thing' which was important, which required and was entitled to protection,
which could be threatened and whose destruction or violation would cause far-
reaching damage."' She writes:
The Federalists drew on a tradition (Locke, for example) which
emphasized rights as the object of legitimate government and hence the
limit to it. But in the context of the American fear of popular tyranny,
the conception of rights as limiting values hardened into opposed
categories of state vs. individual and public vs. private. Individual
autonomy was conceived of as protected by a bounded sphere-defined
primarily by property-into which the state could not enter. The sphere
of rights, freedom, autonomy was private.29
Nedelsky acknowledges that "[i]t is certainly not the case that the traditional
conceptions of property-either constitutional or Common Law-have been
26. Id. at 93-104. Epstein acknowledges that his position would invalidate much of the legislation of
the 20th century. Id. at 281.
27. Michelman, Takings, 1987, supra note 21, at 1626-27 (footnotes omitted). Michelman notes that
the actual operation of property law in the Founding Era may have been considerably more qualified and
socially contingent. Id. at 1627 n.138.
28. Nedeisky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox ofPrivate Property, in CONsTTtrrioNALisM
AND DIEmOCRACY 241, 252 n.19 (J. Elster & R. Slagstad eds. 1988).
29. Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE L OF L. &
FEMINISM 7, 17 (1989) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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simple or exclusively material. But they have had a clear material base which
is the core of both the legal and popular conceptions. 30
The Supreme Court's formulations, and the historical portrayals above, all
rest on the assumptions that property is something that is objectively definable
or identifiable, apart from social context, and that it represents and protects the
sphere of legitimate, absolute individual autonomy.31 The thrust of such con-
ceptions of property is the identification of what the individual's autonomous
sphere should be, based upon the recognition and protection of individual
interests alone. If individual interests fall within the layperson's "ordinary
understanding," are "reasonable," serve a valid economic function, or concern
the possession, use or disposition of corporeal or incorporeal objects, then they
are property; the consideration of collective interests is a distinctly separate and
second-order matter. When this absolute approach to property is combined with
seemingly absolute constitutional guarantees, 32 a difficult problem is presented.
Property rights, like all individual rights, are rarely absolute in any society.33
If property is that which objectively describes the individual's autonomous
sphere, how can the protection of property under the takings and due process
clauses be reconciled with conflicting social goals? Must we choose between
the artificial manipulation of a purportedly absolute conception (with resulting
intellectual incoherence) and the endorsement of radical individualism if we are
to retain any fidelity to historical or intuitive understandings?
Im. THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO PROPERTY
During the debate in the Federal Convention of 1787, Hamilton stated that
the "[o]ne great obj[ect] of Gov[ernment] is personal protection and the security
30. Nedelsky, supra note 28, at 270 (footnote omitted). Cf. Grey, supra note 23, at 73 (conception of
property held by legal and political theorists at end of 18th century, the high point of classical liberal theory,
"coincided precisely with the present popular idea, the notion of thing-ownership.").
31. This image of property is captured by Charles Reich:
Property draws a circle around the activities of each private individual .... Within that
circle, the owner has a greater degree of freedom than without. Outside, he must justify or explain
his actions, and show his authority. Within, he is master, and the state must explain and justify
any interference.
Reich, supra note 11, at 771.
32. See supra note 3. Under the takings clause, the absolute nature of the constitutional command could
be tempered by a finding of the absence of public use or the payment of implied compensation. Under
current Supreme Court doctrine, however, both are intellectually slender reeds. See, e.g., Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.21 (1987) ("The Talings Clause has never
been read to require the States or the courts to calculate whether a specific individual has suffered burdens
... in excess of the benefits received."); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) ("public
use" requirement is coterminous with scope of putative public purpose).
33. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 491-92 (property is held under implied
obligation that owner's use of it not be injurious to community); 1 R. voN JHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHEN
REcHTs AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN SEINER ENTWICKLUNG 7 (4th ed. 1878) (no property is
independent of the interests of the community).
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of Property."' Fisher Ames wrote that "the great duty of all governments...
is to protect property. '35 The Founders' conception of protection of "property"
is not, however, self-explanatory.
The Federalist No. 10 contains one of the most famous discussions of the
political implications of property. There, Madison describes the inevitable
division of the citizens of a republic into groups with conflicting interests, or
"factions": "number[s] of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of pas-
sion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community."36 He observed that "the most com-
mon and durable source of factions has been the verious [sic] and unequal
distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property
have ever formed distinct interests in society."37
Given the threat that factions present to the functioning of republican
government,38 the question arises whether they can be eliminated from politi-
cal life. Madison concludes that they cannot.39 One reason is the pragmatic
impossibility of any other conclusion; to hope that "enlightened statesmen will
be able to adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the
public good" is to hope in vain.' The second reason is even more fundamen-
tal: factions are caused by liberty. It is the liberty to exercise reason that causes
differing opinions to be formed. It is the exercise of diverse, individual faculties
which is the source of unequal distributions of property, which in turn present
an "insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests;" since "[t]he protection
of these faculties is the first object of government," the causes of faction cannot
be destroyed. 41
All of this could be seen simply as an elaborate justification of existing
property arrangements; indeed, the protection of the rights of the property-
holding minority clearly concerned Madison 2 In The Federalist No. 10, the
ostensible meaning of property is that which we ordinarily understand: Madison
lists creditors, debtors, landed interests, manufacturing interests, mercantile
interests, and monied interests as interests which must be regulated by govern-
34. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 302 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). The original
state constitutions contained explicit protections for property as well. See G. DIMZE, IN DEFENSE OF
PROPERTY 32-33 & n.92 (1963).
35. F. AMES, Dangerous Power of France. No. 11I, in 2 WORKS OF FISHER AMEs 309 (S. Ames ed.
1854).
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
37. Id. at 79.
38. Id. at 77-78.
39. Id. at 80.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 78.
42. In a speech about the question of suffrage, Madison wrote that "the danger to the holders of
property cannot be disguised, if they be undefended against a majority without property.... We must not
shut our eyes to the nature of man, nor to the light of experience." L Madison, On the Right of Suffrage,
in THE COMPLETE MADISON 37 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
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ment 3 However, it is possible to see something else in this discussion. Madi-
son's emphasis upon liberty both as a cause of faction and as something which
entitles property to protection from government suggests that he was concerned
with more than protection of rights in material objects.
In 1792, Madison published an essay entitled, simply, Property. In this
essay Madison discusses property and the role of government in its protection.
He begins with a definition of property in material objects: "This term in its
particular application means 'that dominion which one man claims and exercis-
es over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individu-
al.' " He then proceeds to describe a conception of property that is far broad-
er:
In its larger and juster meaning, [property] embraces every thing to
which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to
every one else the like advantage.
In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandize [sic], or money
is called his property.
In the latter sense, a man has property in his opinions and the free
communication of them.
He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions and in
the profession and practice dictated by them ....
He has property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his
person.
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free
choice of the objects on which to employ them.
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may
be equally said to have a property in his rights.45
Madison then continues:
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well
that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that which the
term particularly expresses....
... [The praise of affording a just security to property, should be
sparingly bestowed on a government which, however scrupulously
guarding the possessions of individuals, does not protect them in the
enjoyment and communication of their opinions, in which they have an
equal, and in the estimation of some, a more valuable property.
.. Conscience is the most sacred of all property; other property
depending in part on positive law, the exercise of that, being a natural
and inalienable right....
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where
the property which a man has in his personal safety and personal liberty,
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 36, at 79.
44. L MADISON, Property, in 6 THE WRrINGs OF JAMES MADISON 101 (G. Hunt ed. 1906). This
definition paraphrases one used by Blackstone. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *2.
45. L MADISON, supra note 44, at 101 (emphasis in original).
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is violated by arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the service
of the rest....
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where
arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its
citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their occupa-
tions, which not only constitute their property in the general sense of
the word; but are the means of acquiring property strictly so called....
If there be a government then which prides itself on maintaining the
inviolability of property; which provides that none shall be taken direct-
ly even for public use without indemnification to the owner, and yet
directly violates the property which individuals have in their opinions,
their religion, their persons, and their faculties; ... such a government
is not a pattern for the United States.
If the United States mean to obtain or deserve the full praise due
to wise and just governments, they will equally respect the rights of
property, and the property in rights....
Madison's essay is curious and provocative. He clearly saw property as
having two distinct meanings. Although it could, in its narrow sense, mean
corporeal or incorporeal objects and our relationships to them, it could also
mean more. His broader understanding of property as including rights to
freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, physical liberty, and the ability
to use one's intelligence and creative powers,4 7 is radically different from the
ordinary understanding of property today.
Although few other American Founders explored the idea as extensively
as Madison, the existence of a broader understanding of property during the
Founding Era has been widely recognized.' The House of Representatives
of the Colony of Connecticut declared that the people have "property in their
own estate," and are "to be taxed by their own consent only.., and are not
to be disseized of their liberties or free customs, sentenced or condemned, but
by lawful judgment of their peers."49 Joseph Story wrote of property not only
46. Id. at 102-03 (emphasis in original).
47. Elsewhere, Madison states that the "faculties of the mind" include "[slense, perception, judgment,
desire, volition, memory [and] imagination." THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 227 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
48. See, e.g., P. EIDELBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERIcAN CONsTTrrION 257 (1968) (property,
during Founding Era, "encompass[ed] whatever is proper to oneself, including the enjoyment of one's
faculties, one's rights and privileges"); F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECruAL
ORIGINS OF TIE CONSTTUON 13 (1985) (property was "subtle combination of many rights, powers, and
duties, distributed among individuals, society, and the state"); J. REID, THE CONCEPT OF LBERTY IN THE
AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 24-25, 72 (1988); Levy, Property as a Human Right, 5 CONST.
COMMENTARY 169, 174-77 (1988) (18th century concept ofproperty included constitutionalrights and other
liberties).
49. Declaration of the House of Representatives of the English Colony of Connecticut (May, 1774),
reprinted in 14 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 347-48 (1887).
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"in things, but of property... in actions."'  Alexander Hamilton suggested
that property includes not only material objects but also rights and privileges,
particularly those of office.51 A Revolutionary Era pamphlet described political
slavery as "being wholly under the power and control of another as to our
actions and properties" 2 ; it meant, in the words of Bernard Bailyn, "the in-
ability to maintain one's just property in material things and abstract rights,
rights and things which a proper constitution guaranteed a free people."53
The broad conception of property found in Madison's essay, and implicit
in the writings of others in the Founding Era, is not an aberration in intellectual
history. Madison's essay reflects an understanding that was common in the
writings of the English Whigs, an intellectual tradition to which the Americans
were heirs. 4 The broad conception of property that is associated with Whig
ideology55 can be found in the pamphlet literature of the seventeenth century.
The term "property" or "propriety" was widely used in the seventeenth century
to include constitutional liberties as well as other matters.5 6 "[Property] was
generally meant to include the natural rights which appertain to man, the protec-
tion of which was the chief object of the State's existence."57 A pamphlet pub-
lished in England in 1644 declared that "God... hath... made us absolute
proprietors of what we enjoy, so that our lives, liberties and estates, doe [sic]
50. Story, Natural Law, quoted in J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
321 (1971) (emphasis in original).
51. P. EIDELBERG, supra note 48, at 123. Eidelberg suggests that John Marshall's decision in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), supports this view. P. EDELBERG, supra, at 123 n.18.
52. [Moses Mather], America's Appeal to the Impartial World... 48 (Hartford, 1775), quoted in B.
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 233 (1967) (brackets and ellipsis in
B. BAILYN).
53. B. BAILYN, supra note 52, at 233; see also J. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 97-98 (1986) (during Revolutionary Era, no dichotomy existed
between personal and property rights; "personal rights were personal property"); G. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 219 (1969) ("Eighteenth-century [American] Whiggism... made
no rigid distinction between people and property. Property [was] defimed not simply as material possessions
but... as the attributes of a man's personality that gave him a political character .... Property was not
set in opposition to individual rights but was of a piece with them.').
54. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, supra note 52, at 34-54; F. MCDONALD, supra note 48, at 77-78.
55. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 507 (1975) (discussing Whig roots of 18th-
century civic humanist idea that"personality was founded in property, perfected in citizenship butperpetual-
ly threatened by corruption"); Minogue, The Concept of Property and Its Contemporary Significance, in
PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII, supra note 23, at 3.
56. See P. LARKIN, PROPERTY IN THE 18TH CENTURY 52-53 (1930); Macpherson, The Meaning of
Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 7 (Macpherson ed. 1978); see also R.
OVERTON, AN ARROW DIRECTED AGAINST ALL TYRANTS AND TYRANNY... WHEREIN THE NATURAU.
AND NATIONALL RIGHTS, FREEDOMES AND PROPERTIES OF MANKIND ARE DISCOVERED [sic] (1646), cited
in P. LARKIN, supra, at 45 n.2; W. PRYNNE, A SUMMARY COLLECTION OF THE PRINCIPAL FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, PROPRIETIES OF ALL ENGLISH FREEMEN (1656), discussed in P. LARKIN, supra, at 53
n.l.
57. C. CZA]KoWSKI, THE THEORY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
23 n.62 (1941).
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not depend upon, nor are subject to, the sole breath or arbitrary will of our
Soveraigne [sic]." '58
The Whig view of property found its most articulate and influential spokes-
man in John Locke. Locke's views exerted a powerful influence on the Ameri-
can Founders and on the early years of American jurisprudence. 59 He wrote
Two Treatises of Government, published in 1690, to challenge the despotic
power of kings and to establish the existence of individual rights that could be
asserted against arbitrary and oppressive exercises of government power. For
Locke, the inherent liberties and rights of individuals were expressed in the
concept of property. For him, property was derived from the nature of human
personality: "Though the earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all
Men, yet every Man has a PROPERTY in his own person."' A man's proper-
ty was intimately connected with his person, with his "being master of him-
self. ' 61 Locke's conception of property, rooted in human personality, was
broad; it included not only material resources or external objects, but also men's
"Lives, Liberties and Estates."62 Locke defined property as that which "with-
out a man's own consent... cannot be taken from him."63 One commentator
has observed that "the Lockean ideal of life, liberty and estate envisages
property as 'moral space,' within which an individual has control over his own
affairs. ' 4
It is apparent that property, under this historical view, was broadly defined.
It was tied to the notion of human beings as masters of themselves; it involved
the maintenance of personal integrity in both a physical and nonphysical sense.
It was intimately related to the development of the human personality, to the
exercise of independent thought and creative powers. It was universal and
reciprocal: it was that to which we, as human beings, "attach a value and have
a right, and which leaves everyone else to the like advantage."'65
58. England's Monarch or a Conviction and Refutation by the Common Law of Those False Principles
... of Albericus . .. etc., (London, 1644) (anonymous), quoted in P. LARKIN, supra note 56, at 52.
59. See B. BAILYN, supra note 52, at 26-30; T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICAmISM 22-
24, 126 (1988); Whelan, Property as Artifice: Hume and Blackstone, in PROPERTY: NoMos XXII, supra
note 23, at 126.
60. J. LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government § 27, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett
rev. ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698) (emphasis in original).
61. Id. at § 44. See F. MCDONALD, supra note 48, at 10-11 (discussing Locke's usage of "property"
as meaning "particular to, or appropriate to, an individual person").
62. . LOCKE, supra note 60, at §§ 123-124. The writings of Hobbes also gave property a wide
meaning. He assigns to the sovereign power "the whole power of prescribing the rules, whereby every man
may know, what goods he may enjoy and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of his
fellow subjects; and this is it [sic] men call 'propriety'.... These Rules of propriety, or meum and tuum,
and of 'good,' 'evilL,' 'lawfull,' and 'unlawfull' in the actions of subjects, are the Civil Lawees...." T.
HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN Ch. 18 at 113 (Oakeshotte ed. 1946). See L. BECKER, PROPERTY PIGHTS-PHILO-
sopinc FOUNDATIONS 120 n.11 (1977) ("property" often used by Blackstone, Hobbes and Locke to refer
to all of a person's legal rights).
63. . LOCKE, supra note 60, § 193.
64. A. REEVE, PROPERTY 142-43 (1986).
65. J. MADIsON, supra note 44, at 101.
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The most apparent difference between this conception of property and most
contemporary formulations is its explicit inclusion of a very broad range of
individual interests under the rubric of property. The comprehensive approach
to property goes far beyond property as physical objects and their analogs to
include freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, free use of faculties, and
free choice of occupations. 66 The inclusion of a broad range of individual
rights, liberties, powers and immunities in the conception of property changes
the nature of property's concreteness. Its concreteness lies not in an actual or
symbolic tie to corporeal or incorporeal objects, but in the mediating function
that property serves between individual rights and governmental power.67
The inclusion of additional rights, however, does not necessarily result in
a different understanding of the relationship between the concept of property
and the conflict between individual interests and collective power. A broad
range of individual rights may be as entitled to absolute protection as a narrow
one. Property may still represent, simply, the sphere of legitimate, absolute
individual autonomy. Is there any basis for concluding that the comprehensive
approach is founded on a different vision? Further, does the inclusion of
particular rights-or the manner of their protection-have any implications for
this approach?
To the extent that the comprehensive approach is a rights-based theory, the
individual interests that it includes are necessarily subject to collective defini-
tion and limitation. A right can be defined as that which fulfills an individual
need or individual interest that is considered to be of sufficient moral impor-
tance to justify the generation of duties for others.68 The dependence of a right
upon "justification" or upon duties of "moral importance" means that its
existence must be rooted in some concept of human well-being: 69 someone
has a right if and only if, other things being equal, an aspect of that person's
well-being is a sufficient reason to hold someone else to a duty.70 Since a right
by its very nature must be recognized not only by the claimant but also by oth-
ers,71 the concept of human well-being-and, through it, the identity of pro-
tected individual interests-must be collective in nature. Collective notions of
66. Cf. Macpherson, supra note 56, at 2 (defining property simply as a bundle of rights, duties, powers,
and immunities). Note that even where such sweeping definitions of property are advocated, it is rare to
find rights such as freedom of conscience, freedom ofexpression, or freedom to use individual talents among
the property rights contemplated.
67. Cf. J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 55, at 463 (function of property, in 18th century, was "to affirm
and maintain the reality of personal autonomy, liberty, and virtue").
68. A. CARTER, supra note 2, at 139 ("Property rights... involve the coercion of those who do not
respect them. Such coercion requires moral legitimation.") (footnote omitted).
69. Well-being has been defined as what individuals, "endowed with distinctively human capacities
of thought, rational choice and action, need if they are to be able to pursue their own individual ends as
progressive beings." H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 189 (1983).
70. See J. WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 86 (1988).
71. The existence of a right lies "in the conception on the part of everyone who concedes the right
to others and to whom it is conceded, of an identity of good for himself and others." T.H. GREEN, LECTURES
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 216 (1921).
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
well-being are apparent both in the choice of rights contained within the
comprehensive approach to property,72 and in the requirement that the included
rights be reciprocally and universally granted.73
Encompassed within the comprehensive approach is an involvement of the
collective beyond simple definition or limitation of rights. The rights included
in this conception of property may be broadly described as being of two kinds:
those which protect the autonomy and security of the individual against interfer-
ence by others-those which, in effect, protect negative liberty-and those
which guarantee something more.74 Rights of the first kind are a part of any
conception of property,75 and are the essence of the absolute approach. But
rights of the second kind distinguish the comprehensive approach from other
modem formulations, and imply a fundamentally different role for the collective
in the concept of property.
By distinctly tying the broad range of human rights contained within the
concept of property to the development of human personality,76 the compre-
hensive approach not only assumes a collective role in the definition or limita-
tion of individual property rights, but also assumes a collective context for their
exercise and realization. If protected individual rights are necessary for the
development of personality, there is an implied dependence upon social context
for development and fulfillment of these rights.? This can be seen, for in-
72. Madison's statement that property, in its broader meaning, "embraces everything to which a man
may attach a value and have a right," J. MADISON, supra note 44, at 101, necessarily refers to both
individual and collective assessments of what is deemed important for human happiness or well-being.
73. This restraint could be viewed in contractarian terms: only those rights that are agreed to be given
to others can be chosen for oneself. "[Ilf the law is such that a whole people could not possibly agree to
it.... it is unjust." L KANT, On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political Right, in KANT'S
POLITICAL WRITiNGS 79 (H. Reiss ed. 1970).
74. See I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969) (discussing
positive and negative liberty).
75. Liberty is an incident of ownership and, therefore, is a part of any conception of property that
involves ownership or individual control over corporeal or incorporeal things. See Grey, supra note 23, at
69 (identification of property with rights of ownership is essence of"ordinary" understanding of property).
Ownership has been described as liberties of use, powers of alienation, and claims to control against
interference by others. See . PENNOCK, Thoughts on the Right to Private Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS
XXII, supra note 23, at 172; Philbrick, supra note 7, at 702.
76. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 66, at 52-53 (T. Knox ed. 1942) (Through the exercise
of rights to property, a person gains "those goods, or rather substantive characteristics, which constitute
[one's] own private personality and the universal essence of [one's] self-consciousness .... Such character-
istics are [one's] personality as such, [one's] universal freedom of will, [one's] ethical life, [one's]
religion."); see also Minogue, supra note 55, at 11-12 (etymological root of term, proprius, means "one's
own"); Overstreet, The Changing Conception of Property, 25 INT'L J. OF ETHICS 165 (1915) (discussing
property as an extension of personality); Radin, supra note 13, at 958, 961-78 (discussing extent to which
Locke's and Hegel's theories, among others, view object and community relations as central to self-
constitution).
77. As such, the rights contained within the comprehensive approach could be seen as expressions of
positive liberty. Positive liberty has been variously described as an individual's interest in being one's own
master, or the instrument of one's own will; the opportunity to develop personality; and the freedom to
establish a place in a community of wills. All theories of positive liberty view social interaction and social
context as at least partially constitutive of the personality and well-being of the individual. 3. WALDRON,
supra note 70, at 298-302, 313.
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stance, in Madison's statement that the security of property requires governmen-
tal elimination of "restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies" that impair
individuals' free use of their faculties and free choice of their occupations.78
By envisioning a collective context for the exercise of the individual rights con-
tained within the concept of property, the comprehensive approach gives the
collective an integral role within the concept of property itself. Property is not
simply that which describes and protects individual autonomy; rather, it is a
complex concept that includes a broad range of human liberties understood
within a collective context of both support and restraint.
Admittedly, during the Founding Era, "property" retained its narrow as well
as its broad meaning;79 it is therefore difficult to tell, in the absence of explicit
usage, which meaning was intended in any particular context. The fact that the
term had multiple meanings leads to a difficult question. If both conceptions
existed during the Founding Era, why (in contemporary interpretations of that
Era) is the comprehensive approach often overlooked? Why is it generally
assumed that the absolute conception was the exclusive understanding during
that period?
The answer to this question is, I believe, found in the nature of the two
conceptions and in the rise of individualistic theories, The comprehensive ap-
proach incorporates the historical tension between the individual and the collec-
tive; although there were strong elements of collectivism and individualism in
the historical conception, it required no particular resolution of the tension
between these elements in the form of a particular property system or particular
property rights. 0 The absolute conception, however, advances a clear case for
the supremacy of individual interests by defiming property to be that which de-
scribes and protects the individual's autonomous sphere.81
78. . MADIsON, supra note 44, at 102-03.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 36-53; see also L LOCKE, supra note 60, at §§ 31, 135, 138
(using property in its narrow sense); F. MCDONALD, supra note 48, at 4, 10 (noting multiple understandings
for "property" during Founding Era).
80. Recognition of a collective role within the concept of property did not, for instance, result in an
assumed need to redistribute physical property between rich and poor or to otherwise radically reorient social
or political values. See Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 L
L. & EcON. 467, 468-69 (1976) (Locke made private property antecedent to government in order to allow
for limited revolution: alteration in government, without alteration in existing property allocations).
An inherent tension existed between the 18th-century view that property is crucial to the development
of personality, or that property secures liberty, and the simultaneous view that no redistribution of wealth
was required. If property (including material property) is necessary for the development of personality or
the maintenance of personal and political independence, it is difficult to see how its deprivation can be
justified. Eighteenth-century theorists attempted to circumvent this difficulty by stressing that it is the
security of property, not property itself, that ensures liberty. L REID, supra note 48, at 5, 70-73. This does
not, however, address the essential problem. If "[m]aterial possessions... bolstered liberty by making
individuals independent of government"', id. at 5, the conclusion is inescapable that some enjoyed greater
"liberty" or "property" than others.
81. The Supreme Court's takings and due process clause jurisprudence illustrates that this is a logical
fallacy: defining property as that which describes and protects the individual's legitimate sphere does not,
of itself, determine which individual interests are "legitimate" and which are not.
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During the Founding Era, older notions of property systems based upon
ideas of trust and individual duties as well as rights82 competed with newer
theories which advocated commercial growth and wealth maximization through
the protection of individual initiative and interests.83 Many of these newer
theories held individual rights to be of extraordinary importance-indeed, such
rights were viewed as shields against royal authority and other arbitrary pow-
er.' The growing importance of the protection of individual rights, and an
implicit equation of the absolute conception with that protection, led to a strong
identification of property with the absolute conception. 5
Thus, while absolute protection of individual interests in the possession, use,
and disposition of material objects was often the outcome of these tensions
between competing individual and collective interests, protection of particular
interests was not synonymous with the concept of property itself. The compre-
hensive approach stresses that property, in the historical understanding, served
a mediating function between individual rights and governmental power. It
neither contained nor encouraged absolute individual protection over collective
goals.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Reclaiming the comprehensive approach has profound implications for our
understanding and treatment of the concept of property. For example, use of
the comprehensive approach would force courts to face explicitly the real policy
issues involved in cases under the takings and due process clauses. The Su-
preme Court's current jurisprudence under these clauses has been driven by an
absolute approach, whereby property is something that is objectively identifi-
able, that represents and protects the individual's autonomous sphere. The
Court's vision of property-whether defined in terms of "ordinary understand-
ings,""5 "reasonable expectations,"87 or another approach 8 -- does not vary
82. Before the 17th and 18th centuries, the possession of land was associated with governance: the
possession of property gave entitlement to rule, with its privileges and responsibilities. See Philbrick, supra
note 7, at 707-10 (discussing feudal origins of idea that all property is held subject to performance of duties,
including public ones); Rose, Public Property, Old andNew, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 216,219-21 (1984); Rose,
supra note 14 (manuscript at 17-21, 25-26); see also F. MCDONALD, supra note 48, at 10-13 (property
historically viewed as combination of many rights, powers, and duties, distributed among individuals, society,
and the state).
83. See, e.g., I MADISON, supra note 42, at 37 (Property is an essential object of the law, "which
encourage[s] industry by securing the enjoyment of its fruits."); see also Rose, The Ancient Constitution
vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 NW.
U. L REV. 74, 87-88 (1990) (discussing decline of Old Regime and rise of belief in role of private property
systems in increasing total national wealth and power).
84. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 36; P. LARKN, supra note 56, at 12, 20, 145-64
(discussing prevalence of this view among American Founders); I LOCKE, supra note 60, at §§ 91, 94, 95,
138.
85. Cf. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 42-46 (1986) (belief that
government had legitimate power and indeed duty to tax citizens for relief of poor coexisted with under-
standing that purpose of government was to protect individual property rights).
86. See supra note 9.
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according to collective pressures or goals, since it is precisely the resistance
to the demands of the collective that this approach to property provides. When
the absolute approach is combined with seemingly absolute constitutional
guarantees, the inevitable accommodation of social goals results in intellectual
incoherence and seeming arbitrariness.
The Supreme Court's ostensible use of an absolute approach to property
results in a kind of patent dishonesty: property is portrayed as a matter of
technical understanding or definition, while the conception is artificially manip-
ulated to reach a result that is compatible with social goals. As a result, the
inevitable balances between individual and collective interests are struck silently
without explanation.89 Explicit acknowledgement of the mediating function
of property, and the involvement of the collective in determining the nature and
scope of individual rights, makes explicit the real policy issues.
The framework developed by Calabresi and Melamed in Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral90 reveals the
problems inherent in the use of an absolute approach to property and suggests
how the comprehensive approach can resolve these problems. Under their analy-
sis, entitlements created by property and tort law are of three types: those
protected by property rules, those protected by liability rules, and those which
are inalienable.9 Entitlements protected by property rules can be taken only
if the holder agrees to the price offered, giving him veto power over the
transaction. 92 Entitlements protected by liability rules may be taken if the other
party pays a value established by the state; they may therefore be taken without
the holder's consent. 93 No transfer of inalienable entitlements is permitted. 4
The language of "entitlement" suggests that an absolute conception of
property-property as something objectively defined which describes and
protects the individual's autonomous sphere-underlies the rules that the model
describes. An entitlement, as implied by the word itself, is not partial or contin-
87. See supra note 10.
88. Other approaches include the "functional" approach, the "bundle of rights" approach, the
"personhood" approach, and the protection of reliance interests. See supra notes 11-13.
89. The Penn Central case seems to be an exception. There the Court's majority engaged, at least in
part, in explicit balancing of individual and collective interests. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978). However, the Court's ostensible use of an absolute conception of property
made the balancing theoretically incongruous: if property is objectively identifiable and absolute, it is
impossible to understand how there is room for the "balancing" of collective interests. Justice Brennan
attempts to reconcile this difficulty by suggesting that even if particular property rights are destroyed by
governmental action, the strength ofcollective interests may mean that a constitutionally cognizable "taking"
has not occurred. Id. at 130-35. This ignores the fact that whether a particular governmental action is a
"taking" depends upon the nature of the underlying right. See supra note 14. If property rights are (as the
Court generally envisions) objectively identifiable and absolute, it is impossible to see how any impairment
is not a taking.
90. 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
91. Id. at 1092.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1092-93.
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gent; it is one's absolute property. For entitlements protected by property rules,
this is true. For entitlements protected by liability rules, however, and those
deemed inalienable, it is not. In those instances, we have things which the
language of "entitlement" calls property, but which can in fact be subject to
deprivation (protection by liability rules) or their disposition subject to complete
control (declarations of inalienability) by others.95
The conflict between entitlements and their less-than-absolute protection
mirrors the deep ambiguity that haunts decisionmaking under the takings clause.
The takings clause is, at its core, the reduction of "property" protection to
"liability" protection: private property may be taken as long as there is a public
purpose and compensation is paid. Adherence to the absolute image of property,
as that which describes and protects the individual's autonomous sphere makes
this a seeming injustice.
The problem inherent in the protection of a "property" right by a liability
rule is further reflected in the remedy that is usually afforded for an unconstitu-
tional taking: the court strikes down the offending legislation, rather than
remanding the case for assessment of compensation.96 Although this remedy
might be the result of difficulties in valuation in some cases, an equally plausi-
ble explanation is that the courts are simply reluctant (despite the explicit
language of the takings clause) to relegate private property to liability protec-
tion.97 The effect of the underlying, absolute conception of property can also
be seen in the measure of damages claimed or awarded under a liability rule.
If compensation is at issue, the amount claimed (or awarded) is the entire value
of the property at stake. This is true even when the existence of the property
interest rests upon arguably divisible parts, such as "reasonable" and "unreason-
able" expectations.98
The comprehensive approach works a fundamental change in these relation-
ships. If the conception of property describes the tension between the individual
95. See Coleman & Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L. 1335 (1986) (discuss-
ing theoretical inconsistency implicit in liability rule protection for rights which imply autonomy or control
of right-holder).
96. See, e.g., Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491,
491-92 & n.2 (1981). An exception may appear in cases where there is a temporary taking. See, e.g., First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). In such cases,
compensation is awarded because the fundamental problem no longer exists: the claimant has regained the
property in issue, making the question of property protection irrelevant.
97. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1124-27 (discussing, in context of criminal sanctions,
society's need to prevent property rules from being changed at will into liability rules). Calabresi and
Melamed identify a number of reasons why legal writers have largely ignored the possibility of protection
of entitlements by liability rules in nuisance-pollution cases. Id. at 1116-17. I would advance another if
property is that which describes and protects the individual's absolute sphere, the coupling of this notion
with the notion that these rights can be enjoyed only upon payment of compensation to someone else (or,
if viewed in the mirror image, that the rights of the other party can be taken away upon the payment of
compensation) is deeply troubling. It is this reluctance-this instinctive avoidance of the protection of
seemingly absolute property interests with liability rules-that haunts the Court's treatment of takings cases.
98. The failure to consider partial compensation is particularly striking in cases where a preexisting
use is later claimed to be a public nuisance. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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and the collective, rather than a particular outcome of that tension, the problems
inherent in the reconciliation of an absolute approach with less than absolute
protection do not exist. In the language of Calabresi and Melamed, if
"entitlements" or their analogues are seen in contingent (rather than absolute)
terms, the protection of those entitlements by liability rules will not compromise
the underlying conception of property. The protection of property rights by
liability rules (as is required by the takings clause) loses its aura of illegitimacy,
resulting in greater flexibility in the application of liability rules and in the
computation of damages awarded under them.99
Adoption of the comprehensive approach would also eliminate the inherent
problem in the reconciliation of absolute protection of property with the need
for different treatment of individual and collective interests in the context of
the takings and due process clauses."to Differing definitions of property in
the context of the two clauses cannot be reconciled as long as the underlying
assumption is that property is objectively definable or identifiable, apart from
social context. A conception of property that includes explicit acknowledgement
of collective concerns does not present this difficulty.
One might object that, although the comprehensive approach to property
may have been workable at one time, it is an anachronism today when individ-
ual and collective interests are at fundamental odds. Many scholars have written
about the prevalent eighteenth-century belief in the identity of individual and
social interests.10 1 If individual and social interests coincide, there is certainly
less need for, and less danger posed by, an interventionist state. In modem
pluralistic society, this alignment of individual and social interests, if it ever
existed, exists no more.
Belief in the alignment of individual and social interests would reduce the
envisioned tension between the individual and the collective contained within
the concept of property. However, the fact that this tension (or its recognition)
may have increased does not mean that it should be hidden through the use of
a conception of property which purportedly describes inviolable individual
rights but which does not provide absolute protection. The fact that increased
99. Cf. Coleman and Kraus, supra note 95, at 1345-46 (Rights are merely conceptual markers or
placeholders used to designate subset of legitimate interests or liberties to be accorded special protection
by law; specific content or meaning for such rights is "a normative, not an analytic, one supportable, if at
all, by substantive agreement, not linguistic convention.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Put in
the terms of the subject of this essay, the definition of property as that which defines and protects the
individual's sphere of autonomy or control (the "absolute" approach) is replaced by a conception where
questions of control are seen as normative, chosen by agreement, and internal to the concept itself. Coleman
and Kraus frame the issue as rethinking the nature of rights; I would frame the issue as whether the tension
between the individual and the collective is external to the concept of property, or internal to it.
100. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
101. Prior to the end of the 18th century, it was traditionally believed that the interests of the individual
were essentially identical to those of society. See G. WOOD, supra note 53, at 219. By the end of the 18th
century, however, "Americans were emphasizing more and more the 'different and discordant interests'
existing in all societies." Id.
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tension between the individual and the collective may exist in contemporary
society demands that the balances involved be struck after more scrutiny, not
less. We cannot escape the difficult questions that these conflicts present. The
law of property already addresses them-by default, if not otherwise. The only
question is whether they should be decided with or without explicit examina-
tion.
Recognition that any conception of property inevitably involves the balanc-
ing of individual and collective interests leads to a final question: would the
adoption of the comprehensive approach mean any more than the universally
recognized idea that individual rights, protected under the rubric of property,
must exist in a collective context? Put another way, is there any difference
between viewing property as a collage of individual rights balanced against
external, collective interests, and viewing the competing interests of the individ-
ual and the collective as part of the conception of property?
The answer, I believe, lies at least in part in the power of the concept of
property. Despite assertions to the contrary,1 2 property retains its symbolic
meaning and rhetorical power.1 3 Contemporary approaches to property-even
those that define the concept in broad human or economic terms-proceed from
a vision of property as that which protects, and separates, the individual from
the collective sphere. t°4 In recent years, the assumption that protection of the
individual is the final, irreducible political principle has been attacked.0 5
Some have attacked the foundational idea of individual rights;1°6 others have
attempted to develop a model which retains the value of individual freedom in
102. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 23, at 69-74 (arguing that modem conceptions of property weaken
its symbolic nature and threaten its disintegration); Nedeisky, supra note 28, at 251 ("If property is not a
'thing,' .. . not a sacred right, but a bundle of legal entitlements subject... to rational manipulation and
distribution .... then it can serve neither a real nor a symbolic function as boundary between individual
rights and governmental authority.").
103. The fact that the mythology ofproperty (as that which represents the individual's protected sphere)
has survived even though the content of the myth (definitions of protected rights) has undergone continual
change presents, in Nedelsky's view, a paradox. Nedelsky, supra note 28, at 241. Indeed, it is the desire
to capitalize upon this symbolic meaning and rhetorical power that has motivated attempts to broaden the
range of individual rights included within the concept of property. Id. at 255. The continued power of the
myth of property is suggested by a recent study which concludes that "property is increasingly ... viewed
by litigants as a bastion against an ever encroaching state." Donahue, The Future of the Concept of Property
Predicted from Its Past, in PROPERTY: NoMos XXI, supra note 23, at 53.
104. Radin links the protection of individual interests to the extent to which they further "human
flourishing"-a "positive view of freedom, in which the self-development of the individual is linked to
proper social development." Radin, Liberal Conception of Property, supra note 21, at 1688. Although this
approach could lead to the reconceptualization of the tension between the individual and the collective as
something within the concept of property, her focus is upon the extent to which 'personhood" factors should
affect the recognition of traditionally defined (individual) property rights. See id. at 1695.
105. See, e.g., A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981); M. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
106. See, e.g., E. PASHUKANIs, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, in PASHUKANIS: SELECTED
WRIrINGs ON MARXISM AND LAW (P. Beirne & R. Sharlet eds. 1980) (repudiating idea of individual rights);
cf. T.H. GREEN, supra note 71, at 207 (redefining individual rights in terms of communal welfare).
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the context of collective life."m All of these efforts reflect dissatisfaction with
a political tradition which has viewed the self as inviolable and absolute. It is
this vision of self that we have attributed to Locke and the Founders. As a
result of this vision, we are limited to a series of confrontations between
competing selves and competing collectivities.
Property has been seen as the concrete expression of this view of self and
the dichotomy between self and others. The powerful, rhetorical image of
property, as that which gives the individual a bulwark of isolated independence
from her fellows, has been cited as the central symbol of the antagonism
between the individual and collective life. 08 Rethinking the concept of prop-
erty, therefore, has particular symbolic and actual potential as a way to rethink
this vision. The comprehensive approach recognizes the individual's need to
develop the capacities of self in the context of relatedness to others; it stresses
that individual autonomy and social context are in fact deeply intertwined. By
viewing a collective context as necessary for the definition and exercise of
individual rights, the comprehensive approach to property forces us to rethink
the relationship between the community and individual rights. It is a step
toward rapprochement of ideas of individual liberty, individual autonomy, and
collective life.
V. CONCLUSION
Historical theories can provide "a rich fund of insight, reminder, and argu-
ment for modern political theory and debate."to The continuing, mythological
importance of the concept of property, as a matter of intellectual inheritance,
political theory, common understanding, and our constitutional order, makes
reclaiming the historical understanding of property of particular importance.
Contemporary attempts to adhere to an absolute approach to property-to define
property as that which represents and protects the individual's autonomous
sphere-have yielded a choice between an intellectually incoherent and disinte-
grated concept on the one hand and the exaltation of individual interests over
collective interests on the other. By explicitly recognizing the tension between
the individual and the collective as a part of the concept of property, the
107. This effort has been most striking in feminist legal theory. See, e.g., S. BENHABIB, CRIIQUE,
NORM, AND UTOPiA 348 (1986) ("[Olur selfhood give[s] us each a perspective on the world, which can
only be revealed in a community of interaction with others."); Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts and Possibilities, supra note 29, at 7, 9-12 (redefining individual autonomy as combined expres-
sion of "the claim of the constitutiveness of social relations with the value of self-determination"); Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1904-06 (1987) (personhood involves both dissociation
from and interaction with physical and social context). The retention of individual freedom in the context
of formative collective forces also has been attempted in neo-republican political theory, see, e.g., Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1548-51 (1988), and in critical legal theory, see, e.g.,
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLmcs (1975).
108. Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, supra note 29, at 11, 17.
109. L WALDRON, supra note 70, at 136.
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comprehensive approach provides an alternative to this dilemma. It reaffirms
the importance of the concept of property, while recognizing the interdepen-
dence of the self and others.
